Reports

Statement on Verifying the Vote and Auditing Elections

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Voting Technology Project
No abstract available.

Steps to Make Sure Your Vote is Counted: A Guide for California Voters

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Voting Technology Project
No abstract available.

Making Voting Easier: Election Day Registration in New York

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Catherine H. Wilson
Jonathan Nagler
R. Michael Alvarez
As policy makers, election officials, and the public consider whether New York should change the way in which voters are allowed to register to participate in elections, and bring New York State election law into compliance with the Help America Vote Act, we provide an analysis of the potential impact of election dar registration (EDR) in New York. The current system of registration is one in which citizens must register 25 days before election day in order to be eligible to vote. Under EDR this advance registration barrier would be eliminated as citizens could register on election day.

LEVI User Manual

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Shawn Sullivan
A user manual for LEVI voting systems.

Certification of Voting Software: Position Statement

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Ted Selker
Computers are important in every aspect of modern life. Automative tabulating machines are designed to be the most consistent and reliable counting approach invented. Still, questions of reliability, security and auditability persist. Ken Thompson and others have shown that, like other carelessly composed processes, computer programs can harbor potentially criminal activity. To be useful for voting, software must simplify and improve the ability to record and report intentions.

Augmenting Voting Interfaces to Improve Accessibility and Performance

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Lorin F. Wilde
Ted Selker
Jonathan A. Goler
Reading disabled (RD) voters represent approximately 1 in 7 voters. Current electronic voting technologies exhibit substantially different error rates between RD voters and non-RD voters. These error rates are not consistent. For example, full-faced voting systems are better suited for RD individuals, while page-by-page systems are better for non-RD voters. We seek to analyze the differences in the voter’s performance in order to build interfaces that reduce mistakes and errors for both RD and non-RD voters.

Immediate Steps To Avoid Lost Votes In The 2004 Presidential Election: Recommendations For The Election Assistance Commission

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
Voting Technology Project
We recommend four immediate steps that the Election Assistance Commision (EAC) should take to improve the electoral process for the November 2004 presidential election. We also provide below a number of other steps that we believe are necessary for avoiding lost votes in the presidential election this fall. However, as time and resources are limited, we recognize that these additional steps might be difficult to achieve nationwide by November.

Improving the Election Day Survey

Date Published: 
11/30/2008
Author(s): 
R. Michael Alvarez
Thad E. Hall
The collection of detailed election administration data from local and state jurisdictions across the United States has proven difficult. The problem is partly due to the decentralized nature of election administration in the United States but is exacerbated by the lack of a centralized reporting of election information. Following calls made for better reporting of election administration data in recent years from many groups, including the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, the U.S.

American Confidence in Electronic Voting and Ballot Counting: A Pre-Election Update

Date Published: 
11/03/2008
Author(s): 
Morgan Llewellyn
Thad E. Hall
R. Michael Alvarez
This study examines the confidence that voters have that their ballot was counted accurately in 2004 and the attitudes of the American public toward electronic voting. As many states and localities move to new—and often electronic—voting systems, understanding public confidence and public attitudes is critical for policy makers. This study includes several key findings:

Precinct Voting Denial of Service

Date Published: 
10/05/2005
Author(s): 
R. Michael Alvarez
This is a type of threat that has a long history in electoral politics, and can take many forms.1 The basic approach is that a perpetrator attacks precinct voting, regardless of voting system, on election day in an effort to disrupt the process sufficiently to produce an effective “denial of service” attack. The perpetrator, based on an analysis of past elections returns, would target selected precincts that are highly likely to cast votes in a certain direction.

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